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SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE-AN INDEPENDENT TORT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Spoliation of evidence in a prospective civil action occurs
when one party destroys evidence and thus interferes with the
other party's civil action.' Spoliation of evidence, as a new cause
of action in tort, has been officially recognized in three states and
asserted in several others.' Spoliation of evidence has been com-
pared to interference with contractual or advantageous business
relationships, causes of action which have long been recognized.3
This Note will discuss the tort of interference with prospective
civil litigation by spoliation. Both intentional spoliation and negli-
gent spoliation will be addressed. Appropriate sanctions for spolia-
tion and the ramifications of spoliation will also be addressed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE
Historically, spoliation of evidence has not been tolerated. In
the 1722 case of Armory v. Delamirie,4 a chimney sweep's boy
found a mounted jewel and took it to a goldsmith shop to find out
what it was worth.' The goldsmith's apprentice kept the stone
and returned only the socket to the boy.6 The boy sued the gold-
smith for the apprentice's conversion of the jewel.' The relevant
question in the case was how the jury should be instructed to assess
1. See Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
2. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (recognizing
tort of spoliation of evidence); Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1984) (recognizing tort of spoliation of evidence); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing tort of spoliation of evidence). See also Rodgers v. St.
Mary's Hosp. of DeCatur, 198 Ill. App. 3d 871, 556 N.E.2d 913 (1990) (raising issue of
spoliation of evidence); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177
(1987) (raising issue of spoliation); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990) (raising issue of spoliation of evidence).
3. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (intentional interference with
prospective business advantage allows recovery "for interference with business
relationships or expectations," even if there is no legally binding agreement between the
parties).
4. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
5. Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (1722).
6. Id. The suit was brought against the goldsmith as an action in trover, or conversion,
with the goldsmith ultimately responsible as the master of his apprentice. Id. Under the
pretense of weighing the stone, the apprentice removed the stone from the socket and
reported the value to the boy. Id. The boy refused the amount and insisted on having the
jewel returned to him. Id. However, the apprentice did not return the stone to the boy,
only the empty socket. Id.
7. Id. The court ruled that the finder of a jewel has superior title against all but the
rightful owner and, therefore, may maintain an action in trover. Id.
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damages in viEw of the defendant's spoliation of the evidence.'
Evidence was presented as to the value of a jewel of the finest
quality that would fit that particular socket.9 The Chief Justice
instructed the jury that unless the defendant produced the jewel
and showed that it was not of the finest quality, the jury should
presume the jewel was of the finest quality and determine dam-
ages accordingly."0 Thus, the idea that spoliation of evidence
should not be tolerated dates back at least to the early 1700s."
The belief that spoliation of evidence deserves status as an
independent tort, however, is still relatively new and not widely
accepted.
A. SPOLIATION OF EViDEiC&E AS A ToR'r
Courts that have recognized spoliation of evidence as a tort
acknowledge that spoliation can occur either intentionally or as a
result of negligence.12 Both variations of this tort seek to grant a
remedy to a party prejudiced by the spoliation of evidence; the
first where the opponent has deliberately attempted to interfere
with evidence in the case, and the latter where a duty to preserve
evidence has been breached.'
3
1. Intentional Spoliation of Evidence
In 1984, in Smith v. Superior Court,'4 California became the
first state to recognize the intentional spoliation of evidence as a
separate tort.15 Plaintiff, Phyllis Smith, was injured when a wheel
and tire flew off a nearby van and crashed into the windshield of
her car.'6 Mrs. Smith's injuries included permanent blindness in
8. Armory, 93 Eng Rep. at 664, The defendant goldsmith was seen as the spoliator,
since he was answerable for his apprentice's neglect. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. Spoliation of a jewel was not tolerated in Armory, since the chimney
sweep's boy was allowed to maintain an action in trover against the goldsmith, the
apprentice's master. Id.
12. See, e.g., County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1232, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721
(1989) (recognizing tort of intentional spoliation of evidence); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg.
Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1985) (recognizing tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence).
13. See infra notes 14-65 and accompanying text (discussing whether deliberate
interference has occurred); notes 66-112 and accompanying text (discussing whether a duty
to preserve has been breached).
14. 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).,
15. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 491, 198 Cal Rptr. 829, 832 (1984).
The California court identified the tort as "'Tortious Interference with Prospective Civil
Action By Spoliation of Evidence' .... Id. at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (quoting the
petitioner's complaint).
16. Id. The Smith vehicle was southbound on California Avenue while the van was
traveling north on California Avenue at approximately the same time. Id.
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both eyes and an impaired sense of smell. 17 One of the defendants
was an auto dealer, Abbott Ford, who had customized the van
with "deep dish mag wheels" before selling the van to the other
driver involved in the accident.'" Within weeks of the accident,
Abbott Ford agreed with the Smiths' counsel to preserve certain
items relevant to the pending investigation, including automotive
parts.' 9 Later, Abbott Ford lost, transferred, or destroyed the
physical evidence, thus depriving the Smiths' experts of an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the automotive parts necessary to determine the
cause of the wheel assembly failure.2 °
The court was asked by the Smiths to recognize a new tort for
the intentional spoliation of evidence.21 . Abbott Ford claimed that
the penal statute pertaining to lost or destroyed evidence pro-
vided a sufficient deterrent to spoliation of evidence.22 The court
reasoned, however, that if crucial evidence could be destroyed by
a party who stands to gain financially by the destruction of that
evidence and who will only be punished with a misdemeanor, the
effect of the deterrent would be minimal.2 3 The deterrent effect
that a tort of spoliation of evidence might have was an important
policy consideration for allowing the maintenance of the the
Smiths' suit, when damages were still uncertain due to lack of liti-
gation of their personal injury claim.24 Therefore, the court ulti-
mately held for the Smiths and recognized the intentional
spoliation of evidence as a new tort.25
17. Id. The windshield broke and pieces of glass struck Smith in the eyes and face. Id.
18. Id. Following the accident, the van was towed to Abbott Ford for necessary
repairs. Id.
19. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831. Fifteen days after the
accident, Smiths' counsel asked to have the automotive parts preserived for an investigation.
Id.
20. Id. The Smiths wished to have their expert inspect and test the parts involved in
the accident in an attempt to locate the cause of the malfunction of the wheel assembly on
the van. Id.
21. Id. at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
22. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 497, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833. Arguing that California Penal
Statute section 135 preempted the action, Abbott Ford unsuccessfully maintained that a
civil action for intentional spoliation was precluded under California statutory and case law.
Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 1988).
23. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 499, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. Abbott Ford relied on
Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (1959), as support for its argument that
section 135 of the California Penal Code precluded a civil action. Id. at 499, 198 Cal. Rptr.
at 835. The court stated that Abbott Ford was mistaken in relying on Agnew, due to the
fact that when Agnew was decided, concealing or withholding documentary evidence was a
felony under section 135 of the California Penal Code. Id. The California Penal Code has
since been changed, making concealing or withholding evidence only a misdemeanor. Id.
24. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836. In regard to uncertainty of
damages, the court noted that in other tort actions such as libel, slander, and invasion of
privacy, large damages are awarded without any proof of economic harm. Id.
25. Id. at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The court stated that public policy dictated that
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As support for the holding, the court stated that intentional
interference with a prospective civil action is much like the tort of
intentional interference with prospective business advantage. 26
The California court focused on the fact that in both situations lia-
bility is predicated on the commission of intentional acts designed
to disrupt another's potential benefit. The court discussed the
elements of intentional interference with prospective business
advantage, implying that the elements for intentional spoliation
would be much the same.2 8
Five years later, in County of Solano v. Delancy,2 9 another
California court of appeals addressed intentional spoliation.3 °
Delancy involved a personal injury that resulted when the plain-
tiff, Faith Owens, was thrown from a car driven by Brian
Delancy.3 ' Brian, his parents, and the County of Solano, on whose
road the accident occurred, were all named as defendants.32 The
Delancys and their insurer destroyed the car approximately six
weeks after the accident, making the car unavailable for inspec-
tion by the plaintiff.33 The question arose in this case whether an
agreement to preserve evidence was necessary to impose liability
on a party for intentional spoliation of evidence. 34  The court held
the Smiths were entitled to legal protection even though the associated damages were
uncertain. Id.
26. Id. at 501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836. Intentional interference with prospective business
advantage allows for recovery for interference with business relationships or expectations,
even if there is no existing legally binding agreement or there is an unenforceable contract
with the expectations of the parties as the only subject. Id.
27. Id. Abbott Ford allegedly intentionally interfered with the Smiths' opportunity to
win the lawsuit by destroying the vehicle involved in the accident. Id. at 502, 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 837.
28. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The court did not actually list
the elements of intentional spoliation and the reason for not listing them was not given.
29. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1232, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1989).
30. County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1232, -, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 728
(1989). The spoliation issue was raised by the County of Solano, one of the defendants,
against Brian Delancy, the other defendant. Id. In an amended cross-complaint, the
County alleged that both intentional and negligent spoliation had occurred. Id. at -, 264
Cal. Rptr. at 722.
31. Id. at __, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The accident was caused by mechanical defects in
the car along with the negligent driving of Brian Delancy, a minor. Id.
32. Id. Owens alleged that the County's road was unsafe and, therefore, the County
was included in the lawsuit. Id. Anticipating that Owens would commence a lawsuit, the
Delancys retained legal counsel and hired an accident reconstruction expert, who tested
and inspected the car for defects. Id.
33. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 728. The record indicated that
the vehicle was destroyed before the County was even aware of the accident. Id. The
County argued that this situation, where the vehicle was destroyed before the County was
even aware of the accident, was a prime example of why liability for spoliation of evidence
cannot be limited to cases where the defendant has agreed to preserve the evidence or has
been notified to retain it. Id. The County maintained that if an agreement to preserve
evidence was required, a defendant could avoid liability simply by destroying relevant
evidence before those who needed the evidence found out who had it. id.
34. Id. The Delancys asserted two theories: 1) the County could not state a claim for
504
1991] NOTE 505
to the contrary, because liability is based on intentional acts
"designed to disrupt" a potential benefit. 35 Tort liability is essen-
tially nonconsensual; therefore, any expectations of damages cre-
ated by tort liability have no relationship to voluntary
undertakings.3 6
The court in Delancy was the first to identify the five ele-
ments of intentional spoliation .3  The court based the elements on
the premise that if the Smith court had undertaken to list the ele-
ments of intentional spoliation, the elements would have been
identified by analogy to intentional interference with prospective
business advantage.38
The first of the five elements identified was the possibility of
litigation involving the plaintiff.39 The County alleged that litiga-
tion was reasonably foreseeable to the Delancys and their insurer,
as was the possibility that the County would want to examine the
car and could use information obtained from the examination of
the wrecked vehicle in litigation against the Delancys and their
insurer. 40 The court agreed, acknowledging that if litigation was
intentional spoliation unless it could show the Delancys had agreed to retain the wrecked
car; and 2) the County could not state a claim for negligent spoliation unless it could show
the County had notified the Delancys to retain the vehicle. Id.
35. Id. at -., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court was not persuaded that an agreement by
the defendant to preserve evidence was a prerequisite to finding liability for intentional
spoliation of evidence. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
36. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citing Solum & Marzen,
Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J., 1085,
1102 (1987)). In recognizing the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence, the Smith court
focused on the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage, which
is very similar to intentional spoliation of evidence. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App.
3d 491, __, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1984). The Delancy court noted that both torts
predicate liability on intentional acts "designed to disrupt" a potential benefit. Delancy,
215 Cal. App. 3d at __, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
37. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The Delancy court stated
that it did not believe the Smith court would have included an agreement on the part of
the defendant to preserve the evidence had it undertaken the task of listing the elements of
the new tort. Id. (discussing Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1984)).
38. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The Delancy court identified the elements of the
tort of intentional spoliation of evidence as:
(1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff;
(2) knowledge by the defendant of the existence or likelihood of the litigation;
(3) intentional 'acts of spoliation' on the part of the defendant designed to
disrupt the plaintiff's case;
(4) disruption of the plaintiff's case; and
(5) damages proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.
Id. The court then adopted these elements for the purposes of determining the sufficiency
of the County's allegations in the case. Id.
39. Id. The first element was satisfied by the allegation that the Delancys knew the
County would probably be sued. Id.
40. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. The County noted that
Brian Delancy testified that he had driven on the road before the accident and thought it to
be unsafe. Id. The County felt that it was reasonable to assume Brian would have made
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possible, the need for an examination of the vehicle was foresee-
able and therefore sufficient to impose a duty on the Delancys to
preserve the car for the County's benefit.4 '
The second element was knowledge by the defendant of the
litigation or probability .thereof.42  The County suggested that
since Brian Delancy had made statements to the effect that the
road was unsafe, the prospect of litigation against the County
should have been apparent. 43 The court agreed, stating that,
under the circumstances, litigation was reasonably foreseeable."
Therefore, the second element was satisfied.45
The third element was intentional acts of destruction by the
defendant for the purpose of disrupting the plaintiff's case. 41 The
County alleged that the Delancys destroyed the car to deny the
County the benefit of examination of the vehicle because the
Delancys feared that such an examination might lead to discovery
of evidence that would benefit the County.4" The court, in regard
to this element, stated that "[an] intent to 'affect' the plaintiff may
be inferred" and accepted that it was reasonably foreseeable to
the Delancys that the wrecked vehicle could have been used as
evidence against them.48 Therefore, the third element was
satisfied.49
similar statements to his attorneys and the expert his family hired, and that based on this,
the possibility of litigation involving the County should have been apparent. Id.
41. Id. Foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is the most important factor in tort
litigation, and foreseeability was established as a matter of pleading in the Delancy case. Id.
42. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court stated that a claim that another's need for
evidence is not foreseeable absent some form of notice may or may not be true in a given
situation. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
43. Id. The first element asks whether litigation involving the plaintiff has been
commenced or is likely to be commenced. Id. The second element asks whether the
defendant knew of any existing litigation involving the plaintiff or if the defendant knew
litigation involving the plaintiff was likely. Id, The County suggested that because Brian
made statements to the effect that the County's road was unsafe, litigation involving the
County was probable. Therefore, Brian, or at least his attorneys, should have been aware of
the likelihood that the County would be named in a lawsuit by Owens and would need to
see the vehicle involved in the accident to formulate a defense. Id.
44. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at __, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. The Delancys reasonably
should have been aware that the County would be sued, that the County would seek
indemnity from Brian Delancy, and that destruction of the vehicle would prejudice the
County's case. Id.
45. Id. The court found the allegations sufficient to impose a duty on the Delancys to
preserve the car for the County's benefit. Id.
46. Id. The third element was stated by the allegation that the Delancys destroyed the
vehicle to deny the County the benefit of the use of the vehicle as evidence. Id.
47. Id. The County's cross-complaint stated that "the Delancys reasonably should have
known that: the County would be sued; the County would seek indemnity; and destruction
of the car would prejudice the County's case." Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
48. Id. The court stated that there will usually be doubt about what the missing
evidence would have shown, but if uncertainties connected with damages do not rule out
recognition of the tort, the court could not see why uncertainties should preclude
recognition of a duty. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
49. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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The fourth element was whether actual disruption of the case
resulted."0 The vehicle involved in the accident was not available
for inspection by the County and, therefore, the County was
deprived of valuable evidence possibly leading to a defense. 5' In
addition, the fact that a disruption occurred was not disputed in
525this case. Therefore, the fourth element was satisfied.53
Finally, the fifth element was that damages resulted from the
defendant's actions.-4 The damage in this case was the loss of the
use of the car by the County as evidence to defeat the plaintiff's
claim against the County.55 The court noted that this element was
also undisputed in the case.56 Therefore, the fifth element was
satisfied. 7  ....
Based on an examination of the five elements identified, the
court concluded that the County's allegations were sufficient to
state a cause of action for intentional spoliation.58 This, combined
with a determination that a cause of action also existed for negli-
gent spoliation, led the court to reverse the trial court's dismissal
of the County's first amended cross-complaint against the
Delancys.59
In 1986, in Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage,60 Alaska rec-
ognized "a common-law cause of action in tort for intentional
interference with [a] prospective civil action by spoliation of evi-
50. Delancy, 215 Cal. App: 3d at , 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The fourth and fifth
elements of negligent spoliation were "stated by the allegation that if the County had been
able to examine the car, it would have 'summarily defeated' the plaintiff's claim." Id.
51. Id. The County alleged that it could have defeated the plaintiff's claim by showing
that the cause of the accident was a problem associated with faulty parts on the car or
negligence on the part of the driver. Id.
52. Id. at __, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731. An area of dispute in the Delancy case was
whether or not liability for intentional spoliation of evidence depends on an agreement on
the part of the defendant to preserve the evidence. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 728-29. The
court, however, stated that an agreement on the part of the defendant to preserve evidence
was not a necessary element of intentional spoliation. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The
true elements of intentional spoliation, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages, were
not disputed in Delancy. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
53. Id. The fact that the County's case was disrupted as a result of the destruction of
the vehicle was not in dispute. Id.
•54. Id. at -. , 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
55. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
56. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The element of damages was not disputed in
Delancy. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court next went on to determine that elements
of negligent spoliation were also satisfied in the County's. first amended cross-complaint. Id.
at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729-31.
59. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731. Presiding Justice Anderson respectfully dissented,
stating among other things that he was concerned that the majority decision would lead to
wrecked cars cluttering up the California countryside. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 736
(Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson stated this belief was based on the fact that
virtually every accident involves the possibility of litigation. Id.
60. 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:501
dence."6 ' The ease involved the owner of a massage parlor who
sought to recover against the municipality, the city prosecutor,
and police officers for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and viola-
tions of civil rights arising from the alleged alteration of an arrest
tape.62 In recognizing the intentional spoliation tort, the court
found the reasoning in Smith v. Superior Court to be persuasive.63
In Smith, the California court had stated that intentional interfer-
ence with prospective civil actions was an unreasonable interfer-
ence with the interests of others and that a prospective civil action
carries with it a "probable expectancy" that the court must protect
from interference.' The Alaska Supreme Court determined that
Hazen's prospective legal actions were valuable probable expec-
tancies and that any intentional alterations would be unreasonable
interference with those expectancies.6" Therefore, by adopting
intentional spoliation as a new tort, the court sought to provide a
remedy for such wrongs.
2. Negligent Spoliation of Evidence
The California Court of Appeals first recognized the tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence in Velasco v. Commercial Build-
ing Maintenance Co.' Velasco involved an action brought by an
attorney's clients against the maintenance company that cleaned
the attorney's office. 67 The plaintiffs, Pedro Velasco and his son,
61. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986). Penny
Hazen, the owner of a massage parlor in Anchorage, Alaska, brought suit following her
arrest for prostitution. Id. at 458.
62. Id. at 459. An officer with a hidden recorder entered Penny Hazen's massage
parlor and discussed the services that were available, including whether or not sex was
available. Id. at 458. On the original tape, Hazen could be heard denying the availability of
sex. Id. Later, the tape was requested during discovery for the civil suit brought by Hazen.
Id. at 459. The tape was then found to be generally inaudible; however, evidence pointing
to tampering could be heard on the tape. Id. It was obvious that this important item of
evidence had been altered, and Hazen added a claim of destruction of evidence to her
complaint. Id.
63. Id. at 463. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
of the Smith court).
64. Id. at 464 (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 502, 198 Cal. Rptr.
829, 836-37 (1984)). The court in Smith analogized intentional spoliation to the tort of
intentional interference with prospective business advantage. Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at
501, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
65. Hazen, 718 P.2d at 464. If the arrest tape was intentionally altered, resulting in an
unreasonable interference with Hazen's prospective legal actions, then tort law can provide
a remedy. Id. Hazen's prospective false arrest and malicious prosecution actions were
valuable probable expectancies, and tort law provides a remedy by allowing an action for
interference with those expectancies. Id.
66. 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1985).
67. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 876, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 504, 505 (1985). The plaintiffs alleged that the agents of the owner of the building in
which the plaintiffs' attorney worked negligently destroyed the remnants of the exploded
bottle while cleaning the office of the plaintiffs' attorney. Id.
508
sustained personal injuries when a bottle exploded.68 The Velas-
cos took the remains of the bottle to an attorney in the hopes of
bringing a lawsuit for the injuries caused by the bottle. 69  The
attorney left the remains of the bottle on his desk, and the clean-
ing person later disposed of it while cleaning the attorney's
office.7 ° The court, relying on Smith, held that a cause of action
may be stated for negligent destruction of evidence that is needed
for prospective civil litigation.71 The court then looked to negli-
gent interference with prospective economic advantage to formu-
late the elements for negligent spoliation.72  These factors
included: (1) the degree that the transaction was meant to affect
the plaintiff; (2) the likelihood of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff actually was injured; (4) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff's injury was the result of
defendant's conduct; (5) the moral blame associated with defend-
ant's conduct; and (6) the desire to prevent future harm.73 The
court focused primarily on the second factor, the likelihood of
harm to the plaintiff.74 The court stated that a reasonable mainte-
nance person should not have been expected to be aware that he
or she was destroying valuable evidence by disposing of a broken
bottle in an unlabeled bag.75 A reasonable person, the court
stated, is entitled to assume that if an item is valuable evidence, it
would be appropriately marked and not left lying around.76 The
court, therefore, concluded that no important policy would be fur-
thered by holding maintenance persons to have a duty not to
throw away items that appear to be trash, simply because, the
68. Velasco, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
69. Id. The remains of the bottle the Velascos brought to the attorney's office were
placed in a paper bag by the attorney. Id. It was not alleged that the paper bag was in any
way marked to identify its contents. Id.
70. Id. Commercial Building Maintenance Company, the defendant, was served and
filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint, which alleged that the maintenance
person negligently destroyed the paper bag containing the remains of the bottle. Id.
71. Id. at 877, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
72. Id. (citing J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407
(1979)).
73. Velasco, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506. TheJ'Aire court relied on
these elements in determining whether a cause of action had been stated. J'Aire, 24 Cal.
3d at 804-05, 598 P.2d at 63-64, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
74. Velasco, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The Velascos' case against
Commercial Building Maintenance Company rested entirely on the fact that the bag
containing the bottle fragments had been deposited in the trash by someone other than the
attorney. Id.
75. Id. When "there can be no reasonable difference of opinion," the question of
foreseeability is a question of law, a discussion properly left to the court. Id.
76. Id. at 878, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07. An unlabeled bag containing a broken bottle
on an attorney's desk is not something that would be expected to alert a reasonable and
thoughtful maintenance person to the fact he or she would be destroying valuable evidence
by discarding it. Id. at 878, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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items are in an attorney's office.77
In County of Solano v. Delancy,78 a California court of appeals
addressed negligent spoliation and, relying on Velasco, explained
the concept more thoroughly.79 The court stated that the main
question was "whether a duty to preserve evidence may arise in
the absence of actual notice of another's need for it," and observed
that for purposes of negligence, the existence of a duty "is entirely
a question of law."8 ° In determining whether a duty existed, the
Delancy court relied on six factors mentioned in Velasco and
stated that foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff was the most
important.8' The underlying premise is that a party who is aware
of potential litigation will most likely know what evidence may be
beneficial to the adverse party. 2 Whether potential litigation
involving the County was foreseeable to the Delancys was found
to depend on the evidence. 3 However, evidentiary matters were
not before the court on this appeal, but rather were established as
a matter of pleading.' This resulted in the court's acknowledg-
ment that the need to eventually examine the car was reasonably
foreseeable to the Delancys. 5 The court found it also reasonably
foreseeable that an examination of the car could have led to the
County's discovery of evidence that could have been used against
the Delancys.86 Given the circumstances, the court found the alle-
gations by the County sufficient to impose a duty on the Delancys
77. Id. at 879, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The court concluded with a statement indicating
that if the loss of evidence in this case was foreseeable, the attorney was the person who
should have foreseen the loss, not the maintenance person. Id.
78. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1232, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1989).
79. County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1232, -, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729
(1989). See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Delancy).
80. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (quoting PROSSER &
KEETON, TORTS § 37 (5th ed. 1985)).
81. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. See Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co.,
169 Cal. App. 3d 874, -, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506 (1985) (listing the six elements to rely on
when assessing whether or not a cause of action for negligent spoliation has been stated).
While foreseeability of harm is the most important factor, the other elements remain
relevant and must be examined. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
82. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The Delancys were alleged
to have known that the car they destroyed would be evidence favorable to the County, the
cross-complainant in the case. Id.
83. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. Evidentiary matters were not before the Delancy
court on the appeal brought by the County for dismissal of their intentional spoliation claim
against the Delancys. Id.
84. Id. Foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the most important element, was among
those established as a matter of pleading in the Owens case. Id.
85. Id. The Delancys evidently foresaw that Owens would bring a lawsuit and went so
far as to retain an attorney and an accident reconstruction expert. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr.
723.
86. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. If the County, upon
examining the car, would have been able to find evidence that a defect in the car caused
the accident, the plaintiff's claim against the County would probably have failed.
to preserve the car.87 The court concluded that where destruction
of evidence enables the spoliator to benefit from his wrongful con-
duct, "a duty to preserve evidence arises solely from foreseeability
of harm to the plaintiff."
88
While the first factor was the most important of the six, the
others are still a part of the determination of a duty to preserve
evidence.8" As for the remainder of the factors, the court deter-
mined that a second consideration when evaluating negligent spo-
liation is the effect the transaction can be expected to have on the
plaintiff.90 The court stated that spoliation may be inferred to
have a detrimental effect on the plaintiff.91
The third factor.dealt with how certain it appears the plaintiff
has been injured. 2 The court found this factor to be problematic,
stating that in most instances involving destruction of evidence,
"there will be doubt about what the evidence would have
shown. '9 3 However, since uncertainties associated with damages
will not keep a court from recognizing a tort itself, the Delancy
court could see no reason for precluding recognition of a duty in
this case.94
The fourth factor concerned the "closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered."'9 5 In
response to this, the court stated that if the County's allegations
that the Delancys and their insurer knowingly destroyed the vehi-
cle in question to the detriment of the County were correct, then
the relation between the conduct and the resulting injury was a
"close" one.9
6
87. Id.
88. Id. The court noted, in regard to duty, "where the evidence is relevant solely to a
third party suit . . . there is no duty [to preserve the evidence] absent actual notice of the
plaintiff's need for the evidence." Id.
89. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
90. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The effect the transaction
was expected to have on the plaintiff was included in the court's decision, among "[o]ther
relevant factors." Id.
91. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. The court did not explain why spoliation may be
inferred to have a detrimental effect on the plaintiff.
92. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. Uncertainties associated with damages are not fatal
to a spoliation claim. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
93. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. Even though doubt may exist, it does not preclude
a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
94. Id. Tort actions for libel, slander, and invasion of privacy allow damages to be
awarded without proof of economic harm or emotional distress. Smith v. Superior Court,
151 Cal. App. 3d 491, -, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1984).
95. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729. This fourth element was
among those listed under "[o]ther relevant factors." Id.
96. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. Evidentiary matters, such as whether or not the
insurer knowingly destroyed the vehicle in question to the detriment of the County, were
not before the court on this appeal. Id.
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The fifth factor to consider was "the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct. '9 7 The Delancy interpretation regard-
ing this factor was that "the potential spoliator need only do what
is reasonable under the circumstances."98 The court stated that
reasonableness would have called for the Delancys to contact the
County, impose a deadline for inspection, and insist that the
County pay for the preservation of the vehicle if they needed it
beyond the imposed deadline.9 9 The court realized that this was,
in effect, requiring the party to notify a potential adversary of the
existence of potential evidence.'0e Yet, the court believed that
this was preferable to condoning spoliation of evidence in situa-
tions where spoliation should be deterred. 10
The final factor for consideration was "the policy of prevent-
ing future harm."'01 2 The court stated that if destruction of evi-
dence is worth deterring, "then 'the policy of preventing future
harm' militates in favor of recognizing a duty."'10 3. After consider-
ing of all these relevant factors, the Delancy court determined
that the County had a cause of action for negligent spoliation.10 4
In June of 1984, Florida recognized a cause of action for negli-
gent spoliation in the case of Bondu v. Gurvich.10 5  This case
involved a woman, Mayme Bondu, whose husband died during
surgery.'06 As personal representative of her husband's estate,
Mrs. Bondu had brought a medical malpractice action against an
97. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The court noted that the cost associated with
preserving the evidence is relevant to the fifth element, "moral blame." Id.
98. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The court considered the
fact that the cost of preserving evidence may be high. Id. The court also gave
consideration to the clutter that might result from preserving all the wrecked cars in the
state. Id.
99. Id. The court stated a potential spoliator should have no greater duty than a "good
Samaritan" who is not required to do more than is reasonable. Id.
100. Id. The court's solution to the problem of costs associated with preserving
evidence was the notification of potential adversaries regarding the existence of potential
evidence. Id.
101. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. The dissent reasoned, however, that the majority
was placing an "intolerable burden" on defendants by requiring them to notify potential
adversaries before destroying evidence. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 735 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
102. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d at __, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
103. Id. at __, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730. The court in Delancy recognized a duty on the
part of a potential spoliator to do what is "reasonable under the circumstances." Id. at -'
264 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
104. Id. at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The order dismissing the County's first amended
cross-complaint against the Delancys was reversed, thereby granting the County a cause of
action for negligent spoliation. Id.
105. 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
106. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In 1979, Dave
Bondu entered Cedars of Lebanon Hospital for an evaluation of his coronary arteries. Id. It
was determined, after several days of testing, that a triple bypass operation was needed. Id.
During the surgery, anesthesia was administered, and Mr. Bondu suffered a cardiac arrest
and died. Id.
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anesthesiologist and the hospital.' 07 The hospital failed to provide
Mrs. Bondu with requested medical records.10 8 As a result, Mrs.
Bondu was unable to obtain an expert witness to testify during her
medical malpractice action, ultimately leading to the defeat of her
claim.'1 9 Mrs. Bondu next pursued an intentional spoliation claim,
asserting that in failing to provide her with the requested medical
records, the hospital had intentionally and negligently interfered
with Mrs. Bondu's cause of action." 0 The court of appeals found
that the hospital had a statutory duty to the patient and the
patient's personal representative to maintain and furnish medical
records, including medical and surgical treatment notes and
reports."' The court then recognized a cause of action for negli-
gent spoliation, based on Mrs. Bondu's allegations of breach of
duty and the fact that the breach resulted in damage to Mrs.
Bondu. I 12
B. STATES DECLINING TO RECOGNIZE THE TORT
In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc.," 3 Minnesota was asked to recognize the tort of
spoliation of evidence and declined to do so. 1 4 The case involved
107. Id. Mrs. Bondu's multi-count complaint charged that the anesthesiologist's
negligence caused her husband's cardiac arrest, that the hospital was negligent in its
selection and supervision of these doctors, and that the hospital was negligent per se by
failing to provide Mrs. Bondu with the requested medical records. Id. at 1309-10.
108. Id. at 1309-10. Mrs. Bondu claimed that the failure to provide her with the
requested medical records was a violation of Florida Statute § 395.202. Id. at 1309. See
FLA. STAT. § 395.202 (1979). This statute, which provided that a hospital has a duty to
maintain and furnish records to a patient or a patient's representative upon request, was
repealed in 1981. See FLA. STAT. § 395.202 (1986).
109. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1313. Count VIII of Mrs. Bondu's complaint asserted
negligence in that the hospital failed to provide Mrs. Bondu with requested medical
records, thus "[frusturating] the plaintiff's ability to pursue certain proof which may be
necessary to establish her case." Id. at 1309.
110. Id. at 1310. Count IX of Mrs. Bondu's complaint alleged that the hospital had
intentionally interfered with Mrs. Bondu's case by purposely destroying or losing the
anesthesiology records, which again resulted in "[frusturating] the plaintiff's ability to
pursue certain proof which may be necessary to establish her case." Id. at 1309-10.
111. Id. at 1312. The duty to maintain and furnish medical records to a patient or a
patient's personal representative was determined by the court to exist in Florida Statute
section 395.202 . Id. at 1313 (citing FLA. STAT. section 395.202 (1979)).
112. Id. Chief Judge Schwartz dissented in part. Id. at 1313 (Schwartz, C.J.,
dissenting). The new tort recognized by the majority in Chief Judge Schwarz's view "runs
counter to the basic principal that there is no cognizable independent action for perjury, or
for any improper conduct even by a witness, much less by a party in an existing lawsuit."
Id. at 1314.
113. 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990).
114. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d
434, 439 (Minn. 1990). The court noted that "only Alaska and California had specifically
recognized an independent spoliation tort, aside from ordinary negligence claims," and
that several jurisdictions have declined to adopt the tort either as a matter of law or on the
facts of the case. Id. at 437.
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a fire insurer, Federated Mutual, who brought an action against
Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., the owner of a facility in
which the insured's property was destroyed by fire. Federated
Mutual also brought an action against Litchfield Precision's legal
counsel for negligence, intentional or negligent spoliation of evi-
dence, and intentional interference with prospective business
advantage." 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Feder-
ated Mutual's causes of action were premature since they were
based on speculative harm to Federated Mutual's prospective sub-
rogation action for the alleged negligent or intentional destruction
of evidence by fire. 1 16
In reaching this conclusion, the Federated-Mutual court noted
that "[c]ourts have long afforded redress'for the destruction of evi-
dence.""' 7 In the court's opinion, existing remedies adequately
address the problem."l8 For example, the jury may infer that the
missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party failing
to produce it, discovery and criminal sanctions may be applied,
and knowing involvement by an attorney could subject that attor-
ney to professional discipline.1' 9 The court then suggested that
future actions for "negligent spoliation [of evidence] could be
stated under existing negligence law without creating a new
tort. '12 0 In spite of this suggestion, the court went on to state that
the mere fact that other remedies exist does not necessarily pre-
clude the court from creating a new tort for further redress. 12
115. Id. at 435-36. A fire occurred on January 25, 1986 at a building owned by
Litchfield Precision Components (LPC), resulting in destruction of property owned by
Infinite Graphics (IG). Id. Federated Mutual was IG's insurer and paid IG $48,685 for the
property destroyed. Id. Federated Mutual hired an investigator to determine the cause of
the fire. Id. The investigator was denied entrance to the site of the fire by LPC employees.
Id. LPC's insurer, Sentry Insurance Company, retained Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan, a
law firm, to determine potential liability. Id. The Robins firm assigned investigators to
investigate the cause of the fire. Id. As a result, an exhaust motor and fan were sent to
Georgia, and approximately half of the remaining evidence was stored in a rental
storehouse. Id. The items stored in the rental warehouse were eventually destroyed. Id.
The parties disputed the circumstances surrounding the destruction, and Federated Mutual
filed a civil suit against the Robins firm and LPC on several grounds, including negligent or
intentional spoliation of evidence. Id. at 435-36.
116. Id. at 439. Federated had not pursued its subrogation claim at the time the case
was brought. Id. at 436.
117. Id.
118. Federated Mutual, 456 N.W.2d at 436. The court stated that "an action for
negligent spoliation could be stated under existing negligence law without creating a new
tort." Id.
119. Id. at 436-37. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 37.01 and 37.02 (failure to comply with order
compelling discovery); MINN. STAT. § 609.63, subd. 1(7) (1988) (intentional destruction of
evidence); MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.4(a) (professional discipline may be appropriate).
120. Federated Mutual, 456 N.W.2d at 436. The court noted that Federated Mutual
had, in fact, framed one of its causes of action as a negligence claim. Id.
121. Id. at 437. See Christianson v. Olson, 191 Minn. 166, 168, 253 N.W. 661, 662
(1934) (statutory remedy not exclusive, new tort may be created for further compensation).
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The Federated Mutual court appeared troubled by the specu-
lative nature of the case at the time the action was brought, noting
that the possibility of future harm was not adequate to satisfy the
third element of spoliation of evidence; namely, the requirement
that damage to the plaintiff be shown.' 2 In addition, the court
stated that the presence or possibility of mere negligence is not a
tort and does not become actionable until the wrongful conduct
has an impact on a person. 1 3 In the future, should facts present
themselves in such a way that a party could show that harm was
actually suffered, the Minnesota Supreme Court's comments and
reasoning suggest that the court might consider creating a new
tort that would permit further redress.'2 4
In Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital of Decatur,2 ' an Illinois
court was asked to recognize the tort of spoliation of evidence.126
In Rodgers, the spouse of a deceased patient filed a medical mal-
practice suit as administrator of his deceased wife's estate against
St. Mary's Hospital and the obstetricians and radiologists responsi-
ble for his wife's care immediately prior to her death. 127 Rodgers
alleged and established that his wife died as a result of complica-
tions that arose after the cesarean section delivery of their son. 128
Due to lack of x-ray evidence, Rodgers was unsuccessful in his
medical malpractice claim against the radiologist.' 29 As a result,
he instituted a second suit alleging damages resulting from St.
Mary's alleged loss of all abdominal x-rays of his wife within five
122. Federated Mutual, 456 N.W.2d at 437. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322
N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 1982) (discussing the idea that "the threat of future harm, not yet
realized, will not satisfy the damage requirement").
123. Federated Mutual, 456 N.W.2d at 437. See, e.g., Uppgren v. Executive Aviation
Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Minn. 1969) (mere negligence "in the air" is not
enough for a tort action, rather no action arises until the wrongful conduct impinges on a
person).
124. Federated Mutual, 456 N.W.2d at 437. Based on the court's comments and
reasoning, the key factor for declining to recognize spoliation of evidence as a tort seems to
be the lack of proof with regard to damages. Id.
125. 198 I11. App. 3d 871, 556 N.E.2d 913 (1990).
126. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 198 Ill. App. 3d 871, -, 556 N.E.2d 913,
914 (1990).
127. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 914. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
hospital and Mr. Rodgers appealed. Id. The appellate court ultimately reversed and
remanded the case. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 919. Ultimately, summary judgment was
entered in favor of St. Mary's Hospital; a jury returned a verdict in favor of the radiologists
and against Mr. Rodgers; the jury decided in favor of Mr. Rodgers with regard to his claims
against the obstetricians and awarded damages. Id. at __, 556 N.E.2d at 914. The
obstetricians filed for an appeal from the judgment and Mr. Rodgers settled with them for
$400,000 less than the jury award. Id.
128. Id. Rodgers alleged a sigmoid colonic volvulus was or should have been depicted
on certain x-rays taken of his wife. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 915.
129. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 919. A jury found in favor of Rodgers on his claim against
the obstetricians and assessed damages at $1,200,000. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 914.
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years after the x-rays were taken.' 30 Rodgers based his spoliation
claim on the fact that the missing x-rays were crucial for proving
his case against the doctors who were responsible for his wife's
treatment.1 3' The court found a violation of an Illinois statute
requiring hospitals to retain x-rays for five years or for a longer
period of time if notified that there is litigation pending in court
involving a particular x-ray. 132 The statute creates a cause of
action for improper destruction of x-rays which would have been
used as evidence in litigation. 3 3 Having determined that Rod-
gers' complaint of failure to retain x-rays properly stated a statu-
tory cause of action, the court found it unnecessary to decide
whether a wide-ranging common-law spoliation of evidence tort
should be recognized. 34 While the court declined to create a new
tort based on the specific facts of this case, it gave no indication
that the proper circumstances would not lead to the creation of
such a tort.13 5
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc. 136 presented a certified
question to the Kansas Supreme Court for determination of
whether Kansas would recognize a common-law tort action for
spoliation of evidence.13 7 The case originated as a result of injuries
suffered on the job by Mr. Koplin when a piece of equipment
known as a T-clamp failed as a result of an alleged defect.1 3s One
130. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 914. The hospital had taken x-rays of various portions of
Mrs. Rodgers' body during her hospitalization for the birth of her child. Id. at -, 556
N.E.2d at 915.
131. Rodgers, 198 I11. App. 3d at __, 556 N.E.2d at 915. Mr. Rodgers sought $400,000
in damages. Id. He maintained that with the x-ray evidence, the jury would have found the
obstetricians and radiologists jointly and severally liable, and an appeal would not have
been filed by the doctors. Id. Requested damages were the difference between the jury
award and the settlement that was ultimately reached. Id. at __, 556 N.E.2d at 915.
132. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 916. Illinois Revised Statutes Chapter 111.5 provides for
retention for use in litigation of x-ray or roentgen films of human anatomy. Id. (citing ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 111.5, para. 157-11 (1987)).
133. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 916. The "statute seeks to protect the property rights of
persons involved in litigation." Id. Violation of the statute is prima facie evidence of
negligence. Id.
134. Rodgers, 198 I11. App. 3d at -, 556 N.E.2d at 916. The court noted that the tort of
spoliation of evidence had been discussed in two prior Illinois decisions. Id. at -, 556
N.E.2d at 915 (citing Fox v. Cohen, 84 Ill. App. 3d 744, 406 N.E.2d 178 (1980); Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 501 N.E.2d 1312 (1986)). The first Illinois
case addressing spoliation held that the action was premature, and in the second case, the
plaintiff discarded the theory of liability. Id. Abandoning the liability claim eliminated the
need for the missing evidence and also the need to decide whether or not to recognize
spoliation as a tort. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 915-16.
135. Id. at -, 556 N.E.2d at 915-16.
136. 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177 (1987).
137. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, __, 734 P.2d 1177, 1178
(1987). The case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. Id.
138. Id. at -, 734 P.2d at 1178. Mr. Koplin recovered worker's compensation benefits
for his injuries. Id.
of the defendants, Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., was Koplin's
employer.' 39 Rosel Well Perforators had purchased the T-clamp
from the other defendants, Gearhart Industries, Inc., Pengo Indus-
tries, and Geosource, Inc. 4 ° Koplin alleged that after the acci-
dent, Rosel Well Perforators' agent intentionally destroyed the T-
clamp so Koplin would not be able to use it in potential litiga-
tion. 141 Koplin wanted to bring an action against Rosel Well Perfo-
rators for interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation
of evidence. 142 Koplin contended that he was deprived of the val-
uable possibility of recovering product liability and breach of war-
ranty claims.' 43 He claimed that the destruction of the T-clamp
would prevent him from showing how it failed and caused his
injuries. 144
The court acknowledged that two other courts have recog-
nized the tort of intentional interference with a prospective civil
action by spoliation of evidence: the California Court of Appeals
in Smith v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 145 and the
Alaska Supreme Court in Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage.'4 6
However, the Koplin court went on to note that in both of these
cases, the evidence was destroyed by the adverse party in a pend-
ing litigation, which resulted in a direct benefit to the adverse
party.' 47 This was not the case in Koplin.14  In fact, the destruc-
tion by Rosel Well Perforators' agent actually worked to Rosel
Well Perforators' disadvantage, because Rosel Well Perforators
would have been subrogated to any recovery Koplin might have
obtained to the extent of the worker's compensation payments
139. Id.
140. Id. Defendants Gearhart Industries, Inc., Pengo Industries, and Geosource, Inc.
had manufactured and sold T-clamps, including the T-clamp involved in Koplin's accident.
Id.
141. Koplin, 241 Kan. at -, 734 P.2d at 1178.
142. Id. Koplin's prospective civil action was to be an action against Gearhart
Industries, Inc., Pengo Industries, and Geosource, Inc., for breach of warranty and product
liability. Id.
143. Id. The defendant argued that Koplin had already recovered for his injury under
the Worker's Compensation Act and that the Act provides his sole remedy. Id. at -, 734
P.2d at 1178-79.
144. Id. at -, 734 P.2d at 1178. The court accepted Koplin's allegations that an agent
of his employer intentionally destroyed the T-clamp for the purpose of denying Koplin
access to evidence to be used against the manufacturers and distributors of the T-clamp. Id.
at __, 734 P.2d at 1179.
145. Id. at __, 734 P.2d at 1180 (recognizing Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d
491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984), as a case adopting the new tort).
146. Koplin, 241 Kan. at -, 734 P.2d at 1181 (recognizing Hazen v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986), as a case adopting the new tort).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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made to Koplin.'49 Also, Rosel Well Perforators was not an
adverse party in any pending or probable litigation with Koplin
when the destruction occurred.' 50  The court noted that before
there can be recovery in tort, there must be a violation of a duty
owed by one party to the party seeking recovery.' 5' Therefore,
absent a duty to preserve the T-clamp, Rosel Well Perforators was
not a wrongdoer and had an absolute right to preserve or destroy
its property.' 52 The court declined, on the basis of undue burden,
to adopt a tort which would put a duty on an employer to preserve
all evidence that might possibly be used by an employee in a third
party claim.' 53 The court again noted that Smith and Hazen
involved destruction by a party for that party's own benefit, and
stated that the court would not determine at that time if Kansas
would recognize the new tort under similar circumstances.15 4 The
Koplin court answered the certified question in the negative, con-
cluding that "absent some independent tort, contract, agreement,
voluntary assumption of duty, or special relationship of the parties,
the new tort of 'the intentional interference with a prospective
civil action by spoliation of evidence' should not be recognized in
Kansas."155
III. SANCTIONS
Courts that have found a cause of action for spoliation of evi-
dence have imposed primarily two sanctions: preclusion of evi-
dence, , 6 and default judgment. 57 Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure- grants courts the inherent authority to impose
these sanctions.' 58
149. Id. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (1986) (discussing subrogation rights of an
employer).
150. Koplin, 241 Kan. at -, 734 P.2d at 1181.
151. Id. Koplin argued that even though his employer, Rosel Well Perforators, had not
breached a duty to Koplin, the court should not hesitate to adopt a new tort when a party
has been injured by a "wrongdoer." Id.
152. Id. at __, 734 P.2d at 1181-82. The court noted that there were no special
circumstances or relationships in this case which created any duty for Rosel Well
Perforators to preserve the T-clamp. Id. at -, 734 P.2d at 1182.
153. Id.
154. Koplin, 241 Kan. at -, 734 P.2d at 1182.
155. Id. at __, 734 P.2d at 1183.
156. See, e.g., Nally v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 405 Mass. 191, 539 N.E.2d 1017
(1989). See infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text (discussing the Nally case wherein
the court imposed preclusion of evidence as a sanction).
157. See, e.g., Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(imposing default judgment as a sanction); William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition
Corp., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (imposing default judgment as a sanction).
For a discussion of the Telectron case see infra notes 175-187 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the Thompson case see infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
158. See Telectron, 116 F.R.D. at 128 (imposing default judgment as a sanction). Rule
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A. PRECLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
addressed the topic of sanctions for spoliation of evidence in Nally
v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 159 a case involving a products lia-
bility claim for wrongful death. 160 The plaintiff, Gerald Nally, was
the administrator of the estate of his son, Brian Nally, who was
killed when the Volkswagon in which he was a passenger struck a
guard rail.' 6 ' Gerald Nally alleged that defects in the rear seat and
hatchback latching system of the Volkswagon caused the parts to
give way on impact, resulting in Brian being ejected from the
vehicle onto the pavement and ultimately causing Brian's
death. 162 Nally hired an accident reconstruction expert to evalu-
ate the allegedly defective parts. 63 The evidence was destroyed
during the testing by the expert, and Volkswagon contended that
they had no direct evidence to present to a jury as a result. 64
Volkswagon asserted that the resulting prejudice should have pre-
cluded Nally from offering any testimony from the expert con-
cerning the destroyed items.' 65
Justice O'Connor, writing for the court, concluded that when
an expert destroys or alters an item that the expert should have
.known may be important to litigation, the judge should, if asked
by the potentially prejudiced party, preclude the expert from tes-
tifying as to what was observed before or after the alteration and
as to any opinion he might have based on the evidence. 66 The
rationale for such a rule is to eliminate any unfair prejudice that
27(d) provides that where a party fails to "serve a written response to a request for
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request," the court may
enter "such orders in regard to the failure as are just," including those actions authorized by
Rule 37(bX2XA), (B) and (C). For the text of these sections see infra text accompanying note
212.
159. 405 Mass. 191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989).
160. Nally v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 405 Mass. 191, -, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1018
(1989). Originally a Massachusetts Court of Appeals case, Nally was transferred from the
Appeals Court on the initiative of the Supreme Judicial Court. Id.
161. Id. Mr. Nally alleged that the 1978 Volkswagon Rabbit in which his son was killed
was designed, manufactured, and sold by Volkswagon of America, Inc., and
Volkswagenwerk A.G., the defendants in this case. Id.
162. Id. When the automobile struck the guard rail, the rear seat frame supports and
the hatchback door latch gave way. Id.
163. Id. Brian Schofield, an investigating engineer, was hired by Mr. Nally to evaluate
the rear seat frame supports and the hatchback door latch. Id.
164. Nally, 405 Mass. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1018. Volkswagon maintained that
preserving the evidence should have been a high priority for a reconstruction expert. Id.
165. Id. The case was ultimately vacated and remanded. Id. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1022.
166. Id. at __, 539 N.E.2d at 1021. In Nally, Volkswagon, the potentially prejudiced
party, requested the preclusion of the expert testimony regarding what was observed
before the alleged alteration of the evidence. Id. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1018.
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may result from the expert's testimony. 167 The purpose of an
expert is to give an opinion as to defects and causation, and if only
one party's expert has first-hand knowledge of the altered evi-
dence, unfair prejudice may very well occur.168 In addition, Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that the physical items themselves, when
they are in the exact condition they were in immediately after an
accident, are often far more enlightening and instructive to a jury
than oral or photographic descriptions of the same evidence. 16 9
Essentially, the court stated that if destruction of items occurs, and
an expert has had an opportunity to examine the items prior to the
destruction, the expert's description of the items should not be
allowed.' 70 Thus, preclusion of evidence is a recognized sanction
for spoliation of evidence. 17 1
B. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The ultimate sanction under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is default judgment.7 2 Two cases in which courts
have imposed this harsh sanction are Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead
Door Corp. 173 and William T Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition
Corp. 17 4
Telectron involved a complex antitrust issue in which the
plaintiff, Telectron, Inc., moved for default judgment and sanc-
tions against the defendant, Overhead Door, for destruction of dis-
covery documents. 75 The corporate legal counsel for Overhead
Door had ordered the immediate destruction of documents
167. Id. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1021. The rule for dealing with an expert who spoils
evidence should be applied regardless of whether the expert's conduct occurred before or
after the expert was retained by a party to the litigation. Id.
168. Nally, 405 Mass. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1021. Volkswagon maintained that it was
prejudiced because the destruction of the parts in question deprived Volkswagon of
presenting these parts as direct evidence to a jury. Id. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1018. Evidently,
Volkswagon had not had the opportunity to have their experts examine the parts in
question so as to be able to testify as to the condition of the parts immediately following the
accident. Id.
169. Id. at -, 539 N.E.2d at 1021.
170. Id. Whether the expert deliberately or negligently spoiled the evidence is a
question of fact which must be resolved prior to a ruling on the admissibility of the expert's
testimony. Id.
171. Id. Justice O'Connor cited sound public policy as the basis for allowing the
sanction of preclusion of evidence in a case involving spoliation. Id.
172. See Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 128-31 (S.D. Fla.
1987).
173. 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
174. 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984). See also DePuy Inc. v. Eckes, 427 So. 2d 306
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (default judgment imposed).
175. Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 109-10 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
The motion for default judgment was ultimately granted based on the flagrant and willful
destruction of documents which were requested in a production request served upon
Overhead Door Corporation. Id.
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directly pertaining to Telectron's complaint and request for pro-
duction. 176 Overhead Door's attorney ordered the destruction in
a willful and intentional attempt to place documentation, which
was anticipated to be damaging to Overhead Door, beyond the
reach of Telectron's counsel. 17
7
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a defendant's willful disruption of the discovery process fully war-
rants entry of default judgment on the issue of liability.'17  Default
judgment under Rule 37 may be imposed to prevent unfair preju-
dice and also to preserve the integrity of the discovery process.'17
However, before imposing the ultimate sanction of default judg-
ment, the court must determine "(1) tht Defendant acted will-
fully or in bad faith; (2) that Plaintiff was prejudiced by
Defendant's conduct; and (3) that lesser sanctions would not serve
the punishment-and-deterrence goals .... .1810 In Telectron, the
court stated it had no doubt as to the defendant's willfulness in
destroying pertinent documents.' 8 ' Among other things, the
court noted that the corporate legal counsel to Overhead Door
ordered the immediate destruction of documents directly pertain-
ing to Telectron's request for production on the very day these
papers were served.'8 2 This reflected a calculated effort by a key
corporate officer to obstruct Telectron's discovery of relevant
records. 18 3
The court also discussed prejudice to the plaintiff as a result of
the defendant's conduct and determined that the loss of the docu-
ments in question had decidedly prejudiced Telectron's ability to
adjudicate its claims fully and fairly.'8 4 The resulting prejudice
176. Id. In particular, Overhead Door's counsel called for the immediate destruction
of all sales correspondence over two years old generated by the company's Advance radio
control division. Id. at 110.
177. Id. The court said it could not escape the conclusion that the directive from
Overhead Door's counsel was specifically intended to hide Overhead Door's history of
anticompetitive endeavors and to infringe upon and obstruct Telectron's right to open
discovery. Id.
178. Id. at 128. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(bX2XC).
179. Telectron, 116 F.R.D. at 129 (citing Aztec Steel Co. v. Florida Steel Corp., 691
F.2d 480, 482 (11th Cir. 1982)).
180. Id. at 131. The prerequisites to default judgment ensure a proper balance
between the need for good faith adherence to the rules of discovery and a commitment to
protecting the parties' constitutional and policy interests in adjudication of their claims. Id.
181. Id. The court also stated that Overhead Door's contention that no significant
prejudice resulted from the document destruction was "wholly unconvincing." Id. at 110.
182. Id. at 109. Mr. Arnold ordered the immediate destruction of all sales
correspondence over two years old that had been generated by the division whose conduct
was the object of the lawsuit. Id. at 110.
183. Telectron, 116 F.R.D. at 131. The court did not seem to like Overhead Door's
counsel, especially his attitude during questioning. Id. at 131-32.
184. Id. at 132.
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stemmed from both the unrecoverable loss of documents relevant
to Telectron's claims and from the delay, inconvenience, and
expense suffered by Telectron in investigating the document
destruction scheme.1 85
After considering the inadequacy of lesser sanctions, the court
concluded that no sanction short of default judgment, alone or in
concert, would adequately punish and deter similar willful acts in
the future.18 6 Therefore, based on the flagrant dishonesty of Over-
head Door's counsel, the willful destruction of information, and
the resulting prejudice, the court found sufficient misconduct to
warrant the entry of default judgment, noting this to be an appro-
priate sanction when litigants consciously undermine the founda-
tion of the discovery process. 187
William T Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp,'88 is
another antitrust case involving a plaintiff seeking sanctions
against a defendant corporation for discovery abuse.' 8 9 Thomp-
son was a vitamin manufacturer who sold vitamins to the defend-
ant, General Nutrition Corporation (GNC).' 90 After years of doing
business, Thompson concluded GNC's advertisements were false
and misleading on several grounds; primarily, Thompson charged
that many GNC stores stocked inadequate quantities of Thompson
products to meet expected consumer demands. 19' This, Thomp-
son alleged, was a form of "bait and switch" advertising, using
Thompson's product as the "bait.'1 92 During preparation for liti-
gation, GNC destroyed documents and violated court orders and
duties, which amounted to bad faith.' 93 The court noted that this
misconduct was demonstrated when GNC neglected to preserve
185. Id.
186. Telectron, 116 F.R.D. at 134-35. Having found all the necessary elements to
impose default judgment, the court was compelled to conclude that default judgment, as to
the defendant's liability, was the only sanction "fully commensurate" with the wrongdoing
which had occurred. Id. at 131.
187. Id. at 132.
188. 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
189. William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1444
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
190. Id. GNC sold vitamins manufactured by Thompson as well as competing
"national brand" vitamins and GNC's own private label vitamins. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Thompson maintained that GNC advertised Thompson vitamins and stocked
them in inadequate quantities; then when customers would come in looking to purchase
Thompson vitamins, the customers would end up purchasing another brand instead,
because the Thompson products were out of stock. Id.
193. Thompson, 593 F. Supp. at 1454. Documents which were destroyed included: "(a)
Store Order Books . . . (b) Store Order Strips . . . (c) Store Invoices ... (d) Fiscal year-end
inventory count sheets . . . (e) Quarterly inventory count sheets . . . (f) Daily Inventory
Status Reports... (g) Daily and Weekly Ship/Non-Ship Reports... (h) Lost Sales Reports...
and (i) Retail Level Summary Reports .... " Id. at 1445-46.
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critical documents after commencement of the action, failed to
implement procedures to monitor or control document destruc-
tion after commencement of the lawsuit, and made misleading or
incorrect representations to the court and counsel. 94 GNC's
destruction of relevant records resulted in Thompson having to
spend large sums of money in an attempt to discover and obtain
the destroyed records of GNC.' 95
The issue before the court was whether sanctions should be
imposed against GNC.196 The court determined that under Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the sanctions should be
imposed for knowingly and purposefully allowing employees to
destroy important documents. 197 Thompson was prejudiced by
the destruction of relevant records because access to objective evi-
dence was blocked.' 98 Conduct that interferes with another's
ability to build a case creates a presumption that the missing infor-
mation would have permitted the prejudiced party to prove the
claim alleged in the prejudiced party's complaint. 99 The ultimate
sanction of default judgment was determined to be appropriate in
this action, given the willful destruction by GNC and the resulting
prejudice to Thompson. 20 0 The court concluded that imposition of
severe sanctions was required by the severity of the abuses that
occurred, stating that imposition of lesser sanctions would only
reward a spoliator for misconduct.20'
Default judgment is the ultimate sanction under Rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 2 Rule 37 provides that a
defendant's willful disruption of the discovery process fully war-
rants entry of default judgment on the issue of liability.20 3 Default
judgment may be imposed to prevent unfair prejudice and also to
preserve the integrity of the discovery process.20 4 If a court finds
the defendant to have acted willfully or in bad faith, resulting in
194. Id. at 1445-48.
195. Id. at 1456. Among the findings of fact was that the documents and other
evidence destroyed by GNC were not capable of reconstruction or replication. Id. at 1449.
196. Id. at 1444.
197. Thompson, 593 F. Supp. at 1455. GNC was also subject to sanctions under Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for not complying with a Special Master's order
to produce supplier's documents. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Monetary sanctions were also imposed as being necessary to fully compensate
Thompson for the costs made necessary by General Nutrition's conduct. Id.
201. Thompson, 593 F. Supp. at 1456. The destruction of critical documents by GNC
constituted severe misconduct that deprived Thompson of access to the critical evidence
needed to build its case against GNC. Id.
202. Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 128-29 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
203. Id. at 131.
204. Id. at 129.
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prejudice to the plaintiff, and finds that lesser sanctions would not
suffice, it may impose default judgment.2 0 5
IV. RAMIFICATIONS
If a party in North Dakota believes it has been prejudiced by
spoliation of evidence, that party may currently be able to seek
relief under Rule 37 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.2 6 Rule 37 pertains to sanctions that may be imposed when
problems arise during discovery.20 7 Spoliation is generally uncov-
ered at the discovery stage in a lawsuit, because that is when the
parties are requesting production of the evidence they will rely on
to prove their allegations or to form their defenses.2 08 It is for this
reason that Rule 37 is examined.20 9 Rule 37(bX2), in particular,
deals with sanctions a court may impose when an action is pending
and a party fails to comply with an order.2 10  This section is perti-
nent in that a party who has destroyed key evidence will ulti-
mately be unable to produce it when requested to do so.211
According to Rule 37(bX2), if a party fails to obey an order or per-
mit discovery, the court in which the action is pending may make
the following orders:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order
was made or any other designated facts shall be taken
to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the
order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed,
205. Id. at 131. Rule 37 deals with sanctions that are available when, for some reason,
there is failure to make discovery. Id. at 128. Lesser sanctions include an order stating the
designated facts to be taken as established in the claim of the party obtaining the order or
refusing to allow the disobedient party to assert claims or defenses, or to introduce evidence
regarding the designated matter. N.D.R. Civ. P. 37(bX2XA), (B).
206. N.D.R. Civ. P. 37. Rule 37(bX2) deals specifically with sanctions that are
appropriate when there is failure to comply with an order in a pending action. Id.
207. Id.
208. See generally id. (discussing sanctions available for discovery abuse).
209. See generally id. at (bX2XA)-D).
210. N.D.R. Civ. P. 37(bX2). If a party is unable to produce requested evidence after
being ordered to do so, the party will be in violation of the order to comply, and Rule
37(bX2) sanctions will be available. Id.
211. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 37 (discussing sanctions available for discovery abuse).
524 [Vol. 67:501
or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against
the disobedient party[.]2 12
Default judgment is the ultimate sanction a court may impose. 21 3
This ultimate sanction should only be imposed when lesser sanc-
tions have been considered and would not serve punishment and
deterrence goals.21 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not yet been asked to
address the issue of whether spoliation of evidence is recognized
as a new cause of action in tort in North Dakota. As was discussed
earlier in this note, several states that have been faced with the
issue have declined to recognize the tort.21 5 However, most states
have suggested that, under the appropriate circumstances, the tort
of spoliation could be recognized.21 6 Given the position of these
other state courts, it is not unlikely that North Dakota would
choose to adopt spoliation of evidence as a new tort if the court felt
the circumstances were such that existing remedies were not ade-
quate to redress the injury.
V. CONCLUSION
Spoliation of evidence occurs when one party in a civil action
destroys evidence, resulting in interference with the other party's
prospective action.2 17 While spoliation of evidence as a cause of
action in tort has been officially recognized in only California,
Alaska, and Florida, it has been asserted in several other states,
including Minnesota, Illinois, and Kansas.218 The states that have
declined to recognize the tort of spoliation of evidence have either
stated or suggested that under appropriate circumstances the tort
might be recognized.21 9
Spoliation can occur intentionally or as a result of negligence
212. N.D.R. CIv. P. 37(bX2XA)-(C).
.213. William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1456
(C.D. Cal. 1984). See N.D.R. Civ. P. 37(bX2XA), (C) (listing lesser sanctions which may be
imposed).
214. See Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 131 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
215. See supra notes 113-155 and accompanying text (states declining to recognize tort
of spoliation of evidence).
216. Id.
217. See Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
218. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (cases recognizing cause of action for
spoliation and cases declining to recognize tort for spoliation).
219. See Federated Mutual v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
439 (Minn. 1990) (court intimated that under appropriate circumstances spoliation of
evidence might be recognized).
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by a party.220 Both variations of this tort seek to grant a remedy to
a party prejudiced by the spoliation of evidence; the first where
the opponent has deliberately attempted to interfere with evi-
dence in the case, and the latter where a duty to preserve evi-
dence has been breached.22 1
When a court determines that spoliation has occurred, appro-
priate sanctions are either the preclusion of evidence by the diso-
bedient party regarding the destroyed evidence or, ultimately,
default judgment.22 2 For a court to impose default judgment,
however, it must first consider the appropriateness of lesser sanc-
tions, such as preclusion of evidence.
Nancy Melgaard
220. See, e.g., County of Solano v. Delancy, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1232, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721
(1989) (recognizing tort of intentional spoliation of evidence); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg.
Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1985) (recognizing tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence).
221. See supra notes 14-65 and accompanying text (citing cases where deliberate
interference has occurred and a duty to preserve evidence has been breached).
222. See supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text (citing cases where preclusion of
evidence was discussed); and notes 172-205 and accompanying text (citing cases where
default judgment was imposed after considering preclusion of evidence).
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